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non-convex adjustment costs because of a measurement error under the alternative hypothesis
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spurious regression problem.
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Recently, there has been a lively debate between Cooper and Willis (2001,2002,2003a,
2003b) and Caballero and Engel (2004) about the usefulness of the so-called "gap ap-
proach" to investment and labor adjustment. The gap approach is essentially an error-
correction model for employment decisions. It has itself attracted considerable attention
especially to describe lumpy adjustment in the presence of non-convex adjustment costs.1
As an error-correction model, the gap model ﬁrst identiﬁes the desired level of employ-
ment and then in a second step it describes the adjustment of employment as a process
t h a tc l o s e st h eg a pb e t w e e nt h ed e s i r e da n da c t u a ll e v e lo fe m p l o y m e n to v e rt i m e .T h i s
error-correction formulation of employment adjustment is especially attractive in the
presence of non-convex adjustment costs, since non-convex costs imply, in contrast to
convex costs, that the adjustment speed increases when the gap gets larger. As a re-
sult, higher order moments of the ﬁrm-level gap-distribution have explanatory power for
aggregate employment adjustment only if adjustment costs are non-convex.
Yet, Cooper and Willis (2001, 2002, 2003a) argue that the gap approach is neverthe-
less unable to identify non-convexities in adjustment costs. They claim that measurement
errors systematically arise under the alternative hypothesis of convex adjustment costs
and consequently bias the estimates. Therefore, higher order moments of the gap become
signiﬁcant although they should not be so under the convex adjustment-cost alternative.2
As aresult, the gap-approach regressions of Caballero and Engel (1993) and Caballero,
Engel, and Haltiwanger (1997) if considered as a test for non-convex costs,3 lack power.
The measurement error induces a size distortion under the alternative hypothesis.
However, Cooper and Willis only provide evidence for this claim on the basis of a
small number of simulations. This comment now tries to exactely quantify the claimed
size distortion on the basis of a large number of Monte-Carlo experiments. While the
Monte Carlo experiments conﬁrm that the estimates are substantially biased and ex-
cessively dispersed, they reveal eﬀectively no tendency to falsely rejecet the convex cost
model if only the appropriate test is employed. A two-sided test that rejects the convex-
1See e.g. Caballero and Engel (1993,1999), or Caballero, Engel, and Haltiwanger (1995, 1997).
2Note that the terms "null" and "alternative" are used somewhat sloppily in this comment. When
one tests for non-convexities, the null is the convex cost model which has to be rejected. However, we
term the convex cost model the "alternative" since the prior typically is the non-convex model.
This semantic problem just as the econometric problem is similar to the situation with unit-root tests
when one wishes to show stationarity with an ADF or similar test.
3Caballero and Engel (2004) emphasize that their procedure (1993) is not meant to test for non-
convexities, but wants to investigate the aggregate implications of non-convexities. Nevertheless, their
results would be even more striking, if their procedure also provides a test for non-convex adjustment
costs.
1cost hypothesis whenever higher order moments of the gap inﬂuence aggregate invest-
ment is size distorted. Yet, if the test rejects the convex-costs hypothesis only if the
hazard-rate of adjustment is increasing in the (absolute size of the) gap, the test is
(almost) free of any size distortion.
Essentially, these ﬁndings result from the fact that the parameter of the third moment
of gap is biased downwards under the convex-cost alternative and not upwards. More-
over, the parameter estimate for the third moment seems to suﬀer from a substantial
spurious regression problem due to the serial correlation of both, the labor-adjustment
rate and the series of the third moments of the gap. As a result, the ﬁnite sample vari-
ance of the estimate is much larger than the variance calculated from asymptotic theory,
which also explains the sharp contrast of our results and Cooper and Willis’ ﬁndings.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 gives a brief overview
over Cooper and Willis central results and introduces our simulation analysis. Section 3
provides the results from the Monte-Carlo experiments and gives a potential explanation
for our ﬁndings. Finally section 4 concludes.
2 A dynamic optimization framework for investment
Analyzing employment (and investment) data using the gap approach has been intro-
duced by Caballero and Engel (1993, 1999) and Caballero et al. (1995, 1997). All three
papers show that aggregate employment adjustment also depends signiﬁcantly on higher
order moments of the distribution of the gap between desired and actual employment.
While Cooper and Willis (2003a) acknowledge that under the null hypothesis of non-
convex adjustment costs the gap approach may be valid if ﬁrm productivity follows a
random walk, they argue that the procedures used to measure the gap will result in a
severe measurement error under the alternative hypothesis that adjustment costs are
convex and productivity has below unit-root serial correlation.
At the core of their analysis is the value maximization problem of a ﬁrm that employs
the production factor E, e.g. labor. The ﬁrm is subject to a random productivity shock







E−1, where E−1 denotes employment at the beginning of
the period (or at the end of the previous period if one likes). The wage rate is w and the
instantaneous payoﬀ is given by AEα. Consequently, the following Bellmann equation
describes the ﬁrm’s objective:
V (A,E−1)=m a x
E
















2In this equation β denotes the discount factor and E[V (A0,E)|A] denotes expected
ﬁrm value assuming that current productivity equals A. Cooper and Willis (2003a, p.
17) attribute a minor role to the decision on working hours per employee and ﬁnd the
main source of measurement error and "(t)he key to the nonlinearity seems to be the
substitution of the static for the frictional gap [...]". Therefore, in this comment the
choice of hours per worker is neglected (ﬁxed) and the optimization problem is reduced
to the choice of optimal employment levels.
The optimization problem (1) and the gap approach are closely related. If (log)
productivity follows a random walk, the optimal policy ∆e(A,E−1): =
E−E−1
E−1 can rep-
resented as a linear function of the gap z between the current level of employment E−1
and the level of employment E∗ that the ﬁrm chooses if adjustment costs are zero for
the current period.4 The "gap" (deﬁn e di nl o gt e r m s )i sz := ln(E∗/E−1). Moreover, if
(log) productivity is a random walk the desired level of employment is proportional to








Unlike the dynamic target E∗, the static target level E∗∗ c a nb ee a s i l yc o m p u t e df r o m
(2) on the basis of a production-function estimate, so that it is very helpful if one can
use E∗∗ instead of E∗.
The property that E∗ can be substituted by E∗∗ also carries over to the case of
non-convex adjustment costs. However, if adjustment costs are non-convex, the adjust-
ment rate ∆e i san o n - l i n e a rf u n c t i o no ft h eg a pz, and the (conditionally expected)
adjustment-rate E(∆e/z|z) will be (a convex) function of z. Therefore, both results
jointly (linearity of ∆e and proportionality of E∗) allow to construct a test for non-
convexities. For this test, one ﬁrstly estimates the distribution of the gaps on the basis
of the static target and then one regresses aggregate employment change ∆Et on the
ﬁrst and third order moment of the gap distribution (m1
t and m3
t respectively)5
∆Et = µ + λm1
t + γm3
t + ut. (3)
For non-convex adjustment costs both moments have a positive parameter, λ,γ > 0,
while under quadratic adjustment costs γ =0holds. Consequently, if γ is insigniﬁcant,
one can reject the hypothesis of non-convex costs. However, what is important for our
4See Rotemberg (1987)
5This estimation equation corresponds to Cooper and Willis (2003a) estimation equation (18).
3numerical simulations below, the correct test for non-convex costs is a one-sided test for
γ>0.6
Yet, if productivity A is stationary and hence has below unit-root serial correlation
E∗∗ and E∗ are no longer proportional. Cooper and Willis (2003a) show that using
E∗∗ in this case for calculating the gap will introduce a severe measurement error that
varies with the gap. Consequently, this measurement error biases all parameter estimates
and the testing procedure may lack power under the alternative hypothesis of convex
adjustment costs.
In order to quantify the bias and the resulting loss of power, we numerically simu-
late the model to obtain the policy function ∆e(A,E−1). Four model speciﬁcations are
analyzed and for each of the four speciﬁcation the Monte-Carlo experiment is replicated
1000 times. In each experiment, ﬁrst a series is generated for 1010 aggregate productivity
realizations from an AR(1) process with serial correlation parameter ρagg and variance
σ2
agg. This aggregate productivity is added to idiosyncratic productivity, for which a se-
ries is generated (with parameters ρidio and σ2
idio) for 1000 ﬁrms and again 1010 periods.
For simplicity, ρ := ρagg = ρidio and σ2 = σ2
agg = σ2
idio is chosen, so that we have for
each single ﬁrm-productivity series




These productivity series are used to simulate a series for the gap z between static opti-
mal employment E∗∗ and current employment E−1 and a series of employment changes,
using the previously generated policy function ∆e. Finally, we generate the moments of
the gap distribution based on the static employment target and regress the mean relative
employment change ∆Et on the ﬁrst and third moment of this gap distribution using
(3) as the estimation equation. To avoid an inﬂuence of the choice of of initial values,
we drop the ﬁr s t1 0o b s e r v a t i o n si ne a c ho ft h e s er e g r e s s i o n s .
3 Results from the Monte Carlo Experiments
In all simulations we use a discount factor of β =0 .95, a labor share of 65% and a
markup of 25%, so that α =0 .7222. We choose the standard deviation of the shocks
such that the stationary distribution has a variance of 0.008, i.e. σ =0 .02
p
1 − ρ2. We
try two speciﬁcations for the adjustment cost parameter ν,ν =0 .025 and ν =0 .25 which
correspond to ν =1and ν =1 0in Cooper and Willis (2003a) paper due to a diﬀerent
normalization of E. The wage rate w we set equal to 0.06 and for the serial correlation
6See Caballero and Engel (2004, p. 1).












term we try ρ =0 .95 and ρ =0 .99. The mean (log) productivity is set to 0.
For the numerical simulation of the optimization problem we use a grid of 256 points
for both, productivity and employment and perform value function iteration. The pro-
ductivity grid is generated following the procedure outlined in Tauchen (1986) and Adda
and Cooper (2003), by which we also approximate the AR(1) process by a Markov chain
for the optimization problem. The grid for employment is an equispaced grid between
the static optimal employment level for the second highest and second lowest point on
the productivity grid. Table 1 summarizes our parameter choices.
Table 2 reports the main results of our Monte-Carlo experiments. Figure 1 displays
the distribution of estimates for γ, the parameter of the third moment of the gap, in
all four speciﬁcations. The mean of λ, the parameter of the ﬁrst moment, is close to
the values reported in Cooper and Willis (2003a) and the estimate of λ has a relatively
small variance. For γ however, in all four speciﬁcations we obtain a negative mean
and median. Consequently, we substantially over-reject the hypothesis γ =0 . Yet, the
number of rejections using the better suited one-sided test for γ>0 is relatively
close to or even smaller than the value of 5%, which would result if γ was normally
distributed around zero with the standard deviation that is estimated. On the contrary,
there is a slight tendency for underrejection, but there is no tendency to accept the
non-convex cost model although costs are convex.
However, when we compare the standard deviation of parameter estimates to the
average standard deviation that is calculated from asymptotic theory, we ﬁnd that
the estimates are overly dispersed. Especially for γ this problem is substantial.
Potentially this could be the result of a spurious regression problem.T h es e r i a l
correlations of both, ∆Et and zt is approximately equal and vary between 0.4 and 0.75,
see table 3. Granger (2001) shows that the overrejection-rate for the null of no correlation
between these two series should be approximately 10% and 25% respectively.
5Figure 1: Distribution of the estimates of gamma
ν\ρρ =0 .95 ρ =0 .99
ν=0.025































































































































That we ﬁnd a negative estimate for γ on average can be explained as follows: Figure
1 in Cooper and Willis (2003a) shows that the static gap is typically larger in absolute
terms than the frictionless gap, i.e. the correctly measured gap. Therefore, from this
ﬁgure, one would conclude
E∗∗ = E∗ − K (A)+θE−1,0 <θ<1. (5)
Therefore, when productivity is large, most of the ﬁrms will have employment below
the static target level and E∗∗ − E∗ < 0 results. In the same way, when productivity is
small, most ﬁrms will have employment above the static target level, and E∗∗ −E∗ > 0.
The log-transformation now gives the non-linear relation and the negative parameter for
m3
t.
6Table 2: Distribution of parameter estimates for (3), Monte-Carlo experiments 1000
replications
ρν mean median P(|t|>1.96) P(t>1.65) std.err estimate
aver. est. std. err
0.95 0.025 ˆ λ 0.532 0.526 1.000 1.000 3.73
ˆ γ -4.051 -2.00 0.436 0.009 4.66
0.25 ˆ λ 0.178 0.177 1.000 1.000 1.77
ˆ γ -0.428 -0.360 0.298 0.078 1.98
0.99 0.025 ˆ λ 0.575 0.577 1.000 1.000 9.78
ˆ γ -51.58 -55.34 0.956 0.000 12.66
0.25 ˆ λ 0.214 0.209 1.000 1.000 6.34
ˆ γ -7.988 -4.271 0.701 0.015 7.81








0.95 0.025 0.41 0.37 0.9847
0.25 0.75 0.72 0.9402
0.99 0.025 0.48 0.47 0.9947
0.25 0.75 0.72 0.9835
4C o n c l u s i o n
The present paper extends Cooper and Willis (2003a) approach and quantiﬁes the bias
of the gap approach to labor adjustment and investment if productivity shocks have
below unit-root serial correlation. Cooper and Willis provide evidence only on the basis
of a small number of simulations for their central claim that one might falsely accept the
hypothesis of non-convex adjustment costs although adjustment costs are convex if one
runs regressions of the type studied by Caballero and Engel (1993). We now run a large
number of Monte Carlo experiments to obtain the distribution of parameter estimates
of the gap model based on the static target of employment. These experimets reveal
no substantial tendency to overreject the convex adjustment cost model.
Nevertheless, the parameter estimate of the higher order moments of the gap distribution
are biased as Cooper and Willis claim. However, this bias negative.
Moreover, our Monte-Carlo experiments reveal a substantial spurious correlation
problem for the gap-approach regressions if adjustment costs are convex. This spurious
correlation problem is found to be very strong in particular if adjustment costs are
low or if the serial correlation of productivity is large. This spurious regression result is
especially disappointing for attempts to recover structural parameters on the basis of the
7gap regressions by indirect inference, see e.g. Cooper and Willis (2003b). If the simulated
data for indirect inference comes from a model with convex costs, the estimates heavily
vary due to spurious correlation. Therefore, even without any change in the parameters
of the underlying microeconomic model, the simulated model will match a large variety
of regressions from real data simply by replicating the simulation over and over again.
This eﬀect may be strong enough to render the attempt to match gap regressions from
real data with the regressions generated from a simulated convex adjustment-cost model
spurious itself. However, when the adjustment costs are non-convex in reality and one
excludes the convex cost model from the estimation beforehand (e.g. on the basis of
direct plant level observations), the spurious regression problem can be expected to be
less pronounced as there is no serial correlated measurement error involved then.
References
Adda, Jérôme and Rusell Cooper (2003): "Dynamic Economics", MIT Press, Cam-
bridge.
Caballero, Ricardo J. and Eduardo M.R.A. Engel (1993): ”Microeconomic Adjustment
Hazards and Aggregate Dynamics", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108(2), 359-
383.
Caballero, Ricardo J. and Eduardo M.R.A. Engel (1999): ”Explaining Investment Dy-
namics in U.S. Manufacturing: A generalized (S,s) Approach,” Econometrica, 67,
783-826.
Caballero, Ricardo J. and Eduardo M.R.A. Engel (2004): "Three Strikes and You Are
Out: A Reply to Cooper and Willis", NBER Working Paper 10368.
Caballero, Ricardo J., Eduardo M.R.A. Engel and John C. Haltiwanger (1995):
”Plant-Level Adjustment and Aggregate Investment Dynamics”, Brooking
Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1995, 1-39.
Caballero, Ricardo J., Eduardo M.R.A. Engel and John C. Haltiwanger (1997):
”Aggregate Employment Dynamics: Building from Microeconomic Evidence",
American Economic Review, 87(1), 115-137.
Cooper, Russell and Jonathan Willis (2001): "The Economics of Labor Adjustment:
Mind The Gap", NBER Working Paper No. 8527.
Cooper, Russell and Jonathan Willis (2002): "The Economics of Labor Adjustment:
Mind The Gap", Federal Reserve Bank of Mineapolis Research Department Staﬀ
Paper 310.
Cooper, Russell and Jonathan Willis (2003a): "The Economics of Labor Adjustment:
Mind The Gap", Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas Research Working Paper 03-
05.
8Cooper, Russell and Jonathan Willis (2003b): "The Cost of Labor Adjustment: Infer-
ences from the Gap", NBER Working Paper No. 10006.
Granger, Clive W. (2001): "Spurious Regressions in Econometrics", in Badi H. Baltagi
(ed.) "A Companion to Theoretical Econometrics", 557-561.
Rotemberg, Julio J. "New Keynsian Microfoundations" in Oliver J. Blanchard and Stan-
ley Fisher (eds.), NBER Macroeconomics Annual, 69-104.
Tauchen, G. (1986): "Finite state Markov-chain approximation to univariate and vector
autoregressions", Economic Letters, 20, 177-81.
9